Decoupled Farm Payments and the Role of Base Acreage and Yield Updating Under Uncertainty by Bhaskar, Arathi & Beghin, John C.
 
IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY 
Department of Economics 
Working Papers Series 
 
Ames, Iowa 50011 
Iowa State University does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, age, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, sex, 
marital status, disability, or status as a U.S. veteran. Inquiries can be directed to the Director of Equal Opportunity and Diversity, 3680 
Beardshear Hall, (515) 294-7612. 
Decoupled Farm Payments and the Role of Base 
Acreage and Yield Updating Under Uncertainty  
Arathi Bhaskar, John C. Beghin  
October  2007  
Working Paper # 07026  Decoupled Farm Payments and the Role of Base
Acreage and Yield Updating under Uncertainty
Arathi Bhaskary John C. Beghinz
Iowa State University Iowa State University
September 2008
Abstract
In the context of U.S. farm policy, this paper analyzes the effect that expectations
about base acreage and yield updating in future policies have on a farmer’s production
decisions in the presence of price, yield and policy uncertainty. We consider a risk
averse farmer producing a single crop whose income consists of market revenue and
government payments. We consider two policy regimes. Decisions on acreage and
fertilizer use made in the current policy regime are linked to government payments in
the future policy regime through the possibility of a base acreage and yield update in
thefuture regime. Thereis policyuncertaintyabout thepossibility oftheupdates being
allowed in the future. We combine stochastic dynamic programming with present
value calculations to link current acreage and input use decisions to future program
payments. The average optimal planted acreage and fertilizer use are increasing in
the subjective probability of the future update. The estimated maximum percentage
increase in the average optimal planted acreage is 6.25%. The estimated maximum
percentage increase in the average yield, resulting from optimal fertilizer use is much
smaller at 0.134%.
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Acreage and Yield Updating under Uncertainty
Abstract
In the context of U.S. farm policy, this paper analyzes the effect that expectations
about base acreage and yield updating in future policies have on a farmer’s production
decisions in the presence of price, yield and policy uncertainty. We consider a risk
averse farmer producing a single crop whose income consists of market revenue and
government payments. We consider two policy regimes. Decisions on acreage and
fertilizer use made in the current policy regime are linked to government payments in
the future policy regime through the possibility of a base acreage and yield update in
thefuture regime. Thereis policyuncertaintyabout thepossibility oftheupdates being
allowed in the future. We combine stochastic dynamic programming with present
value calculations to link current acreage and input use decisions to future program
payments. The average optimal planted acreage and fertilizer use are increasing in
the subjective probability of the future update. The estimated maximum percentage
increase in the average optimal planted acreage is 6.25%. The estimated maximum
percentage increase in the average yield, resulting from optimal fertilizer use is much
smaller at 0.134%.The 2002 U.S. Farm Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act maintained the decoupled
payments, the so-called direct payments (DPs), that were ﬁrst introduced in the the 1996
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act as the Production Flexibility
Contract (PFC) payments. The 2002 FSRI Act also introduced the counter-cyclical
payments (CCPs), which were also paid on farmers’ historical base acreage and were
triggered by prices that fell below a pre-established level. Farmers were also allowed to
update their base acreage for DPs and CCPs and program yield for CCPs. This possibility
could create incentives for farmers to increase current plantings and yields to increase
future decoupled payments. Thus expectations about future policies is a potential
mechanism linking farmers’ current production decisions and the decoupled payments.
Thefollowing“coupling”mechanismsofdecoupledpaymentshavealsobeenidentiﬁed
in the literature on decoupled payments: (i) in the presence of uncertainty and decreasing
absolute risk aversion (DARA), decoupled payments reduce the coefﬁcient of risk aversion
(wealth effect) and income variability (insurance effect) (Hennessy 1998; and Sckokai and
Moro 2006); (ii) in the presence of imperfect credit markets, decoupled payments can
ease the credit constraints faced by farmers (Roe, Somwaru, and Diao 2003; and Goodwin
and Mishra 2006); (iii) decoupled payments can inﬂuence the labor supply decisions of
farmers, by affecting the choice between leisure and total labor supply or between on-
and off-farm labor supply (El-Osta, Mishra, and Ahearn 2004; and Ahearn, El-Osta, and
Dewbre 2006); (iv) decoupled payments provide incentives to keep land in agricultural use
(including keeping land idle) by increasing land values and rents (Goodwin, Mishra, and
1Ortalo-Magn´ e 2003a; Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magn´ e 2003b; and Roberts, Kirwan,
and Hopkins 2003); and (v) expectations about future decoupled payments can inﬂuence
farmers’ current production decisions (Sumner 2003; McIntosh, Shogren, and Dohlman
2007; and Coble, Miller, and Hudson 2008). See Abler and Blandford (2005); and Bhaskar
and Beghin (2007) for a review of the literature on decoupled payments.
In 2005, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body ruled against the va-
lidity of U.S. cotton direct payments (WTO 2004; and WTO 2005) as a green-box payment.
The ruling was on the basis of planting restrictions, that disqualiﬁed farmers from receiving
these payments if they planted certain fruits and vegetables on base acreage. The Appellate
Body did not rule against these payments on the basis of the base acreage update that was
allowed in the 2002 FSRI Act, as the Body was unable to ascertain the effect such an up-
date would have on farmers’ plantings. Our paper provides a measure of the supply effect
of expected future base acreage and yield updates, both in terms of acreage and yield via
fertilizer use. Farmers may expand acreage and intensify yield by using more fertilizer.
Other papers that have analyzed the effect of expectations about future base acreage up-
date are Sumner (2003); McIntosh, Shogren, and Dohlman (2007); and Coble, Miller, and
Hudson (2008). Coble, Miller, and Hudson (2008) also analyze the effect of expectations
of a future yield update on farmers’ input use. These three papers indicate that positive
expectations about a future base acreage update affects farmers’ planting decisions. Coble,
Miller, and Hudson (2008) especially provide strong evidence from a survey of Iowa and
Mississippi farmers, that farmers attach a positive probability to an expected base acreage
2and program yield update.1
Ourapproachformalizesandquantiﬁestheinﬂuenceofexpectedpaymentsunderfuture
policy which might allow a base acreage or program yield update on acreage and fertilizer
use decisions under current policy. Farmers can increase yields by increasing fertilizer use.
The fertilizer that we consider is anhydrous ammonia. We analyze the impact of updating
expectations on a risk averse farmer’s acreage and fertilizer use decision in the presence of
price, yield and policy uncertainty. The farmer makes acreage planting and fertilizer use
decisions in the current policy regime, (2002-2006), not knowing the policies that will be
in place in the future policy regime (the duration of the 2007 Farm Bill).2
If base acreage updating is allowed in the future regime, then the new base acreage
for DPs is considered to be the average of the acreage in the last four years of the current
regime. The 2002 Farm Bill allowed for other base acreage updating options; however, for
the purpose of this analysis we only consider two of the options, new base acreage as the
average of four years of the current regime and no base acreage update. For details on other
base acreage update options see Young et al. (2005). If program yields are allowed to be
updated, then the new program yield is considered to be 93.5% of the average of the last
four years of the current regime.3
The subjective beliefs of the farmer formed under the current Farm Bill, regarding a
future base acreage and program yield update occurring is discretized into ﬁve values, be-
tween 0 and 1 to capture the varying degrees of policy uncertainty that the farmer faces
about future updates. The farmer’s problem is to maximize the present value of expected
3utility by choosing acreage and fertilizer use during 2002-2006 while taking into account
the possibility of a “future” base acreage and program yield update in 2007-2011. Thus, the
farmer cares not only about her current utility but also about her future utility. The paper is
organized as follows. The model is discussed in the next section. Section 3 describes the
numerical analysis. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
Model
We follow Duffy and Taylor (1994) in formulating the acreage and nitrogen use
optimization problem for a risk averse farmer. The farmer produces a single crop, corn,4
and faces price and yield uncertainty, with price and yield being negatively correlated. She
earns income from the sale of her crop and government payments. Three government
payments are considered: DPs, CCPs and loan deﬁciency payments (LDP). DPs and CCPs
are paid on ﬁxed base acres and program yield, though CCPs are triggered by low prices.5
LDPs are also triggered by low prices, though these payments are paid on current
production. Thus, updating base acreage and program yields would affect DPs and CCPs.
The per-period proﬁt of the farmer is written as:
(1) t = ~ Pt~ Y (Nt;t)At + max(LR   ( ~ Pt   );0)~ Y (Nt;t)At + 0:85D  BA  Yd
+0:85  max(CR;0)  BA  Yc   TC(At;N);
where ~ Pt is the stochastic price, At is the current acreage, LR is the loan rate, ~ Pt   
4represents the posted county price. The LDP rate is the amount by which LR exceeds the
posted county price. To maintain tractability of the model, we abstract from using the
posted county price to compute the LDP rate, as this would have added another stochastic
variable to the model. Instead we use  to link ~ P and the posted county price, where  is
the average gap between season average price and the posted county price.6 We follow
Babcock and Hart (2005) to compute . D is the DP rate, CR is the CCP rate which
equals TP   D   max( ~ Pt;LR), where TP is the target price. Variable ~ Yt(N;t) is the
stochastic yield, which depends on nitrogen application, N and time, t. The deterministic
part of yield, is speciﬁed as a function of the mean of the distribution of yield, EYt, and
the stochastic part of yield is a function of the standard deviation of the distribution of
yield, Y. TC is the total cost of production, which is a function of current acreage and
nitrogen application. BA is the base acreage for the duration of the 2002 FSRI Act, and
Yd and Yc are program yields for DPs and CCPs respectively. Thus, proﬁt t, is a function
of ~ Pt, Nt and At.
The farmer faces policy uncertainty, in that she doesn’t know the policies that will be
in place for 2007-2011, deemed the future Farm Bill period. Speciﬁcally, we consider the
policy uncertainty about a future opportunity to update base acreage and program yields.
The farmer’s expectations about possible future base acreage and program yield updates
are captured by subjective probability, , with  2 [0;1]. Five values of  are considered
to capture the varying degrees of conviction that the farmer has regarding the future base
update.  = 0 implies that the farmer is certain that updating will not be allowed in the
5future Farm Bill. On the other hand,  = 1 implies that the farmer is certain that updating
will be allowed in the future Farm Bill. The farmer takes into account the possibility of
future acreage and yield updates, while maximizing the present value of expected utility
from proﬁts.
The farmer maximizes the present value of expected utility from proﬁts with respect









tU(t(At; ~ Pt; ~ Y (Nt;t))) + 
5(V B + (1   )V NB)
#
;
where U represents the utility function exhibiting decreasing absolute risk aversion prefer-
ences. U is a constant relative risk aversion utility function with U() = 1 
1  for  > 0
and  6= 1, where  is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion.  is the discount factor
and E is the expectations operator over price and yield. The ﬁrst term of (2) represents the
maximization problem under the current regime (2002-2006). The terminal value for this
problem is speciﬁed by the expected utility from the possible future income stream in the
future regime (2007-2011). There are two possible income streams in the future regime;
one associated with updating, V B, and the second, associated with no updating, V NB.
V B is the value function for the stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) problem asso-
ciated with updating (SDPV B) and V NB is the value function for the SDP problem asso-
ciated with no updating (SDPV NB). The farmer weighs future expected utility with . As
6the farmer’s beliefs about the expected base acreage and yield update changes, land alloca-
tion and nitrogen use decisions in 2003-2006 are affected, as decisions in these years could
inﬂuence future farm payments. The new base acreage and program yield are assumed
to be the average of the acreage planted and 93.5% of the reported yields in 2003-2006,
(the last four years of the current Farm Bill), respectively. Thus, equation (2) provides the
link between acreage and nitrogen use decisions in 2003-2006 with future farm payments.
Under updating, there are two avenues for the farmer to increase future direct payments;
ﬁrst, through the new base acreage and second, through the updated program yield. Thus,
the farmer’s current actions affect V B. Hence, the higher is the value of , the stronger is
the link between current acreage and nitrogen use decisions in 2003-2006 and future farm
payments.
The two SDP problems are solved for a ﬁve-year time horizon, representing the years
2007-2011, for a discrete state and control space.7 The decision variables are the current
acreage, At, and current nitrogen application (in lbs /acre), Nt, which are discretized into
r values each. The stochastic state variables are price, ~ P and shocks to yield, ~ . Both
the variables are discretized into t and s number of states respectively. Additionally, for
SDPV B the state space includes all the possible values for the new base acreage and pro-
gram yields. Since price and yield shocks are stochastic, there is a probability associated
with the realization of each of the possible t price and s yield shock states. The probability
transition matrix, M, is a (ts)(ts) matrix containing these probabilities. An element
pi;j;k;l of the probability transition matrix represents the probability of moving from a cur-
7rent price of i and yield shock of j to a price of k and yield shock of l in the next period.




















The two SDP problems for 2007-2011 are:
(4)












l=1 Mi;j;k;lV Bt+1( ~ Pt+1; ~ t+1;BA0;Y 0
d), t = 1;2;:::5 and,
(5)









l=1 Mi;j;k;lV NBt+1( ~ Pt+1; ~ t+1), t = 1;2;:::5
where BA0 is the new base acreage for DPs and CCPs for 2007-2011, and Y 0
d is the new
program yield for the two programs. Variables BA0 and Y 0
d are treated as endogenous state
variables. The option of not updating is also included amongst all the possible base states
considered.
The solution to equation (3) provides the optimal acreage planted and nitrogen applica-
tion rates in 2002-2006, which depend on . Thus, corresponding to each value of  is an
optimal acreage allocation and a nitrogen application rate. The optimal acreage and nitro-
8gen application rate for  = 0 (certainty of no update), are determined by market conditions
and the farm policies of the 2002 FSRI Act. It is the benchmark we use to compare the
optimal acreage and nitrogen application rate for  > 0.
Numerical Solution
We use a discrete state, discrete action stochastic dynamic programming approach to solve
the two SDP problems. The price state variable is discretized into eight state values. The
following price states ($/bu) were chosen to represent the probable range of prices: 1.625,
1.875, 2.125, 2.375, 2.625, 2.875, 3.125 and 3.375. The yield shock state variable is
discretized into two values,  Y, a negative shock and Y, a positive shock. Variable At
is discretized into four values, starting at 750 acres with increments of 50 acres. Similarly,
N is discretized into four values each, starting at 175 lbs/acre in increments of 5 lbs/acre.
Since the farmer can choose any one of the four acreage choices in each of the four years,
2003-2006, and any four of the nitrogen application rates, the total combination of new
base acreage and program yields is large (65,792).
The initial base acreage for DP and CCP is set as the mid-point of the range of the
choice set of At. The initial program yield for DP and CCP is set at 93.5% of the aver-
age EYt over 1998-2001, which is obtained from the optimization of expected utility over
the period 1998-2001.8 Table 2 provides information on other policy parameters. Risk
parameter  is set at 2 (Ant´ on and Le Mou¨ el 2004).
The functional form considered for the total cost, TC(At;N), is TC = FC + (b +
9R + pNN)At + cA3
t, where FC is the ﬁxed cost, R is the rental rate of land, pN is the
price of N and b and c are constants. Given FC;R and pN, we calibrate b and c using
the proﬁt maximization necessary condition and the acreage price elasticity.9 We also ac-
count for the effect of the possible future update on rent as a large proportion of farmers
are tenants. When we solve SDPV B, the total cost includes an additional component that









, where   is the incidence of a $ increase in direct pay-
ments on rent (per acre). We set   at $0.33, as estimated in Roberts, Kirwan, and Hopkins
(2003).
The elements in the probability transition matrix are derived from the joint distribution
of price and yield. We assume that price follows a log-normal distribution and yield follows
a conditional beta distribution, with negative correlation between price and yield. The
parameters, p and q, of the conditional beta distribution are speciﬁed as p = p0 + p1t +
p2N + p3  N2 and q = q0 + q1t + q2N + q3  N2, where t is time and pis and qis are
the parameters to be estimated. We assume that the yield distribution shifts over time. The
parameters are estimated using data from an experimental farm in Iowa (Mallarino, Ortiz-
Torres, and Pecinovsky 2005), using maximum likelihood procedures. The experimental
farm has data on yields for 1979-2003, for four applications of N (0, 80, 160 and 240
lbs/acre), with three replications for each year.10
For estimation purposes, yields from the experimental farm are transformed as, Y =
Y ield mn
mx mn 2 [0;1]. mn, is set at ﬁve bushels less than the minimum observed yield, mx
10is set at ten bushels greater than the maximum observed yield, following Babcock and
Hennessy (1996), and Y ield is the observed yield. Y is now distributed as a conditional
beta distribution, with 0 < Y < 1.
An element of the transition matrix, pi;j;k;l, is derived as the joint probability of price
state k lying in the interval (k; k) and the yield shock state l lying in the interval (l; l).
Thus, the price states have been constructed as mid-points of intervals. The ﬁrst price
interval starts at $ 1.5/bu and goes upto a maximum of $ 3.5/bu in increments of 25 cents.
Similarly, the negative yield shock state,  Y, is considered to lie in the interval, (0;Y)
and the positive yield shock, Y, is considered to lie in the interval, (Y;1), where Y is the
mean of the conditional beta distribution with t = 2002. Once we obtain the parameters
of the conditional beta distribution of Y , we obtain EYt using mn and mx in the proﬁt
function, as EYt = Y(N;t)  (mx   mn) + mn. The same transformation is made to
construct the possible new program yields and the yield shock state values. The yield shock
states are approximately equal to 30 bu/acre deviations around the EYt.
Theexpectedpriceisestimatedusingthedeﬂatedaverageweightedprice11 fortheyears
1985-2007. The following equation was estimated for expected price:12
(6) log(Pt) = 0:38 + 0:58  log(Pt 1) + 0:40Dp
where Dp is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for 1995 and 0 otherwise.13
Once we obtain the parameters of the marginal distributions of price and yield, we use
a copula approach (Cherubini, Luciano, and Vecchiato 2004) to compute the joint proba-
11bility distribution of price and yield. Sklar’s theorem states that if F(V;Z) is a joint distri-
bution function with margins F1(V );F2(Z), there exists a unique copula C, with domain
Ran F1  Ran F2, such that F(V;Z) = C(F1(V );F2(Z)). Thus, it is possible to derive
the joint probability distribution of any two random variables with any marginal distribu-
tions, using a copula. We use a bivariate Gaussian copula to derive the joint probability



















where v = FV(V < v1), z = FZ(Z < z1), x =  1(s) and y =  1(t). Parameter  is the
correlation coefﬁcient between price and yield.
SDPV NB is solved for 16 states (8 price states  2 yield shock states), while SDPV B
is solved for 1052672 states (8 price states  2 yield shock states  256 base acreage
states  257 program yield states). While constructing the new program yields, we need to
account for the possibility of the negative or positive yield shock occurring in each of the
years 2003-2006. There are ﬁve unique possibilities with the yield shocks; negative shock
in all the four years, positive shock in all the four years, negative shock in two years and
positive shock in two years, negative shock in three years and positive shock in three years.
We solve SDPV B for each of these ﬁve cases and compute the expected V B which enters
(3).14
SDPV B and SDPV NB are solved using backward recursion. The terminal value func-
tions, V B6 and V NB6 are initially assumed to be the utility from proﬁts that are close to
12zero.15 We then solve for V B1 and V NB1 and substitute these back as V B6 and V NB6 to
get an estimate of expected utility from future income. We then solve again for V B1 and
V NB1. These are the values that enter in (3). Finally we calculate the present value of
expected utility as deﬁned in (3) for each base acreage state 2 BA0 and program yield state
2 Y 0
d. The farmer maximizes the present value of expected utility over all base acreage,
program yield, price and yield shock states.
Results
The solution to the optimization problem is the optimal planted acreage and nitrogen use
in each of the years 2002-2006, conditional on the price state in the year 2001 and the
farmer’s subjective probability about the expected base acreage and program yield update.
For ease of exposition, we present the results in terms of the average optimal planted
acreage,  A, and the average yield determined by nitrogen use,  Y , over the years
2003-2006, which are determined by the price states. This is because the expected price
states depend on the lagged price states (equation 6). This does not mean that yield shock
states have no impact on the optimal acreage; they affect the acreage and nitrogen
application rate in each year, though this effect is equal across all price states. Hence, we
present the results for the eight price states. Note, that the optimal acreage and nitrogen
application rate for 2002 are not affected by the possible future update, as they do not
count towards updated base acreage or program yield.
 A and  Y for each of the price states and all values of  are presented in table 3. With
13a few exceptions,  A and  Y strictly increase as  increases. When  = 0,  A and  Y are
determined by market conditions and farm programs in place in 2002-2006. Thus,  A and
 Y at  = 0 are the benchmark to which we compare  A and  Y for  > 0.  Aj>0    Aj=0
measures the supply effect of the expected base acreage update. Similarly,  Yj>0    Yj=0
measures the effect of an expected program yield update on nitrogen application rates,
which inﬂuence yields.
We also compute the percentage increase in  A and  Y for  > 0 relative to  = 0.
These are presented in tables 4 and 5. For price states, $1.625, $1.875, and $2.125, farmers
receive both DPs and CCPs. There is therefore a stronger link between an expected update
and future DPs and CCPs.16 For the higher price states of $2.375, $2.625, $2.875, $3.125
and $3.375, only DPs are made to farmers and therefore the results for these price states
captures the supply effect of the expected base update for the “decoupled” DPs.17
The maximum percentage increase in  A is 6.25% for $1.625 and $1.875 and  = 1 and
for $1.875 and  = 0:75. When we average over all price states, the percentage increase in
 A is 4.74% for  = 1. This falls to 3.04% for  = 0:5. When we average over the price
states for which only DPs are received, the percentage increase in  A is 3.84% for  = 1,
which decreases to 2.4% for  = 0:5.
The percentage increase in  Y is much smaller. When averaged over all the price states,
the maximum percentage increase in  Y is 0.055% for  = 1. The reason behind this result
is that increasing nitrogen use has decreasing returns and increasing yields is costly. We
also compute the percentage change in average output (  A  Y ), for  > 0 relative to  = 0.
14The results are presented in table 6. The percentage change in average output is driven by
the percentage change in  A. Averaged over all the price states, the maximum percentage
increase in average output is 4.8% for  = 1.
To ensure that we do not constrain results with bounds of discretization, we also solve
(3) for an extended range of acreage and nitrogen application rates, keeping the number of
choices ﬁxed. The new range for acreage starts at 800 acres, increasing in increments of
50 acres. The new range for nitrogen application rates starts at 180 lbs/acre increasing in
increments of 5 lbs/acre. The results are robust to the new range and show that all solutions
are truly interior ones.
We also solve (3) with   = 0, i.e, when there is no feedback from increased direct
payments on the rental rate of land. The maximum percentage increase in  A and average
output is about 9%. The percentage increase in  Y remains small. The 6-9% range in in-
crease in acreage that we ﬁnd represents an upper bound on the acreage supply response
to an expected base acreage update. These results would be consistent with viewing our
model as a stylized representation of aggregate agricultural supply.
Conclusion
There is a large literature analyzing the effects of decoupled payments in the United States
(the PFC payments in the 1996 FAIR Act and the DPs in the 2002 FSRI Act) on farmer
decisions. Results from the literature on decoupling as well as from our paper indicate that
decoupled payments do have some coupling effects.
15Our paper adds to the current literature, by formally examining and quantifying the
role of base acreage and program yield updating in a farmer’s decision making process on
current acreage and fertilizer use decisions. The latter has been conjectured but not for-
malized in previous analyses. We analyze the effect of expected base acreage and program
yield updates in the future (2007) Farm Bill on a farmer’s acreage decision in 2003-2006,
in the presence of price and yield uncertainty. The average optimal planted acreage under
the current policy (2003-2006) is increasing in the subjective beliefs of the farmer about a
future opportunity to update base acreage and/or program yield. We ﬁnd that the maximum
percentage increase in the average optimal planted acreage over 2003-2006 is 6.25%, and
the maximum percentage increase in average yield from optimal nitrogen use over 2003-
2006 is 0.134%. The maximum percentage in average output (the product of acreage and
yield) over 2003-2006 is 6.39%. The results are conditional on price and certainty of an
update being allowed.
Our results clearly indicate that expectations about future policies inﬂuence producer
decisions. TheseresultshaveimportantpolicyimplicationsfortheWTOnegotiationsinthe
Doha round. At present, the proposals of the U.S. and EU, or even the Harbinson proposal
for the Doha round do not contain any changes to the green-box payments. Furthermore,
the WTO ruling against the cotton DPs in the United States, was on the basis of the planting
restrictions. The WTO Appellate Body did not rule against the base updating allowed for
DPs because it was agnostic on its effects. Our results provide a measure of the effect
of base acreage and program yield updating, which could help in future disputes on the
16legality of decoupled payments. Even though the magnitude of the effect is moderate,
base acreage and program yield updating shouldn’t be allowed for decoupled payments.
Hence, the green-box criteria for decoupled payments must be made clear, with no room
for ambiguities.
Lastly, our model assumes a single crop for tractability. In a more realistic scenario,
farmers would plant more crops and DPs would affect the allocation of land between these
crops drawing land away from non program crops in addition to drawing from idled land.
Wemimicthissituationwithahigheracreagesupplyresponsebutwithoutanyabilitytosay
what would happen to all individual crops. Rationalizing our model as a stylized aggregate
agricultural model, our results provide an upper bound on the aggregate supply response
to an expected base update. Last and somewhat offsetting, our analysis is conducted in
the short run. In the long run, costs curves are ﬂatter and one would expect the acreage
response to be higher than in the short run, even in aggregate. In the long run, acreage
expansion resulting from expected future base update would also increase.
17Notes
1They ﬁnd that on average farmers believe that there is a 40% chance of a future base acreage or program
yield update being allowed.
2We realize that updates have not been allowed in new Farm Bill, however, the question we are analyzing
is not speciﬁc to the current Farm Bill, but is relevant to any future Farm Bill. Furthermore, we are analyzing
the role of expectations in inﬂuencing farmers’ current decisions in the context of decoupled payments, a
relevant question for all countries engaging in decoupled payments based on historical land and/or yield
patterns.
3The 2002 Farm Bill also allowed the farmers to update program yields, as the sum of the program yield
for direct payments and 70% of the difference between the average yields for 1998-2001 and the program
yield for direct payments. We abstract from the latter possibility.
4This simplifying assumption is made to reduce the dimensionality of computations and can be ratio-
nalized as representing a stylized aggregate agricultural crop supply, especially for low values of acreage
responses to price. As explained later, our cost of production speciﬁcation indicates the ability to bring land
into production but does not stipulate where the new land comes from (competing crops or idled land). We
also abstract from rotational considerations.
5 Payments similar in nature to CCPs were made during 1998-2001 on an ad hoc basis due to low prices.
These payments were termed the Market Loss Assistance (MLA) payments, and were then essentially insti-
tutionalized as CCPs in the 2002 Farm Act.
6We compute  for Floyd county in Iowa, as we use yield data from an experimental farm, located in
Floyd county. We discuss this in more detail in the numerical analysis section.
7We truncate all future Farm Bills to a single future Farm Bill. An extension of our model could solve for
an inﬁnite horizon to include future Farm Bills.
8We assume that the program yields for DP and CCP are the same.
9We use an estimate of acreage price elasticity equal to 0.412. This estimate has been taken from Lin
18et al. 2000. Data for FC and R has been taken from ERS data on production costs for corn for the heartland
region. The average for the years 2002-2006 have been used. Data for pN has been taken from ERS data on
U.S. fertilizer prices. The price of anhydrous ammonia has been used. See Appendix A1 for details on total
cost calibration.
10We delete observations for years in which outliers were identiﬁed. Observations for years 1982, 1986,
1988, 1990, 1993 and 1999 were deleted.
11Weights were based on production of corn in each state for the heartland region. Prices were deﬂated
using the GDP price deﬂator.
12All coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level of signiﬁcance.
13The observation for 1995 was identiﬁed as an outlier.
14There is a probability associated with each of these ﬁve cases, derived from the conditional beta distri-
bution.
15We assume that proﬁts are 0.01, as the utility function is not deﬁned for zero proﬁts.
16There is a positive probability associated with moving to higher price states from these lower price states,
however the probability is small.
17There is a positive probability associated with moving to a lower price state from these price states,
however the probability is small.
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23Table 1. Model Parameters
Discount factor  0.95
Coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion  2
Fixed cost FC $ 81444
Rental rate R $ 102.14/acre
Fertilizer price pN $0.19/lb
Cost Coefﬁcient b -217.91
Cost Coefﬁcient c 0.0002
Correlation coefﬁcient between price and yield  -0.34
Rent increase parameter   $0.33
LDP price gap  $0.36
5 bu less than observed minimum yield mn 5.71 bu/acre
10 bu more than the observed maximum yield mx 199.86 bu/acre
Table 2. Policy Parameters
Loan Rate (2002-03) 1.98
Loan Rate (2004-11) 1.95
Target Price (2002-03) 2.60
Target Price (2004-11) 2.63
Direct payment rate 0.28
Base acreage under current policy regime 825 acres
Program yield under current policy regime 134.97 bu/acre
24Table 3. Optimal Choices over 2003-2006
Optimal Acreage (acres)
Probability of update:  0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Initial Price State in 2001
1.625 800 800 825 837.5 850
1.875 800 800 825 850 850
2.125 800 825 850 850 850
2.375 825 850 850 850 850
2.625 850 850 850 850 862.5
2.875 850 850 850 862.5 875
3.125 850 850 875 887.5 900
3.375 850 887.5 900 900 900
Yield from optimal N use (bu/acre)
Probability of update:  0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Initial Price State in 2001
1.625 145.43 145.53 145.63 145.63 145.63
1.875 145.43 145.53 145.63 145.63 145.63
2.125 145.53 145.63 145.63 145.63 145.63
2.375 145.63 145.63 145.63 145.63 145.63
2.625 145.63 145.63 145.63 145.63 145.63
2.875 145.63 145.63 145.63 145.63 145.63
3.125 145.63 145.63 145.63 145.63 145.70
3.375 145.63 145.63 145.63 145.70 145.70
25Table 4. Percentage Change in  A for  > 0 Relative to  = 01
Probability of update:  0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Initial Price State in 2001
1.625 0.00 3.12 4.68 6.25
1.875 0.00 3.12 6.25 6.25
2.125 3.12 6.25 6.25 6.25
2.375 3.03 3.03 3.03 3.03
2.625 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.47
2.875 0.00 0.00 1.47 2.94
3.125 0.00 2.94 4.41 5.88
3.375 4.41 5.88 5.88 5.88
Table 5. Percentage Change in  Y for  > 0 Relative to  = 02
Probability of update:  0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Initial Price State in 2001
1.625 0.068 0.134 0.134 0.134
1.875 0.068 0.134 0.134 0.134
2.125 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066
2.375 0.00 0.00 2.91 0.00
2.625 0.00 0.00 3.81 0.00
2.875 0.00 0.00 2.8 0.00
3.125 0.00 0.00 2.73 0.054
3.375 0.00 0.00 0.054 0.054
1  A is the average of the optimal acreage planted over 2003-06.
2  Y is the average yield over 2003-06 resulting from the optimal nitrogen application rate in each of those
years.
26Table 6. Percentage Change in Average Output for  > 0 Relative to  = 03
Probability of update:  0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Initial Price State in 2001
1.625 0.068 3.26 4.82 6.39
1.875 0.068 3.26 6.39 6.39
2.125 3.193 6.32 6.32 6.32
2.375 3.03 3.03 3.03 3.03
2.625 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.47
2.875 0.00 0.00 1.47 2.94
3.125 0.00 2.94 4.41 5.94
3.375 4.41 5.88 5.93 5.94
3Average output is computed as  A   Y .
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Not intended for Publication
A1. Total cost calibration
Data for the ﬁxed cost, FC, has been taken from Economic Research Service (ERS) data
on production costs for corn. FC has been deﬁned as the total allocated overhead per acre
and includes the following: (i) hired labor, (ii) opportunity cost of unpaid labor, (iii)
capital recovery of machinery and equipment, (iv) taxes and insurance and, (v) general
farm overhead. Given FC, R and pN, we solve for the coefﬁcients, b and c, using the
proﬁt maximization condition and the acreage price elasticity. We calibrate total cost to
the average of 2002-06 data. The corn price and yield, equal $2.39/bu and 157 bu/acre
respectively. For a 825 acre farm, FC = $81;444.
(1)
t =  Pt YtAt+max(LR (  Pt );0) YtAt+DP +CCP  (FC+(b+R+pNN)A+cA
3):
DPsandCCPsdonotenterintotheproﬁtmaximizationcondition. TheaverageLRover





=  P  Y   b   R   pNN   3cA
2 = 0:







  P   Y   b   R   pNN
3c
 1=2  P   Y
6cA
:
We solve for b and c for A = 825 acres and N = 182:5 lbs/acre1. The acreage price
elasticity is equal to 0.412. We get b =  217:91 and c = 0:0002.
1These are the mid-points of the range of choices for At and Nt.
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